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Cutting Science, Ecology, and Transparency Out of National Forest
Management: How the Bush Administration Uses the Judicial
System to Weaken Environmental Laws
by John M. Carter, Mike Leahy, and William J. Snape III

T

he Defenders
of Wildlife
Accountability
Project
undertaken
with theJudicial
assistance
of the Vermont
Law School Clinic for Environmental Law and Policy seeks to fill a data void on the environmental record of
President George W. Bush and his Administration by analyzing all reported environmental cases in which the Bush
Administration has presented legal arguments regarding an
existing environmental law, regulation, or policy before federal judges, magistrates, or administrative tribunals. By examining judicial decisions and legal briefs for federal cases,
the aim is to identify quantifiable trends on whether, or to
what degree, President Bush and members of his Administration are working to preserve, protect, and defend the U.S.
Constitution and laws of the United States as sworn in their
oaths of office.'
John M. Carter is the Judicial Accountability Fellow at Defenders of Wildlife. Carter graduated from the University of the South with a B.A. in Philosophy. He attended law school at Washburn University in Topeka, Kansas, receiving his J.D. with honors in 1997. Following his admission to the
Kansas bar, Carter commenced a solo practice devoted to promoting environmental and rural issues. After prevailing in a Kansas Supreme Court
appeal and preventing the establishment of large-scale swine-concentrated animal-feeding operations in two Kansas counties, Carter wound up
his Kansas practice to hike the Appalachian Trail and continue his legal
education at Vermont Law School. He received his LL.M. degree in Environmental Law from Vermont Law School, summa cum laude. Carter has
published articles on the treatment of nonpoint sources under the Clean
Water Act, current trends in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
litigation, and the Bush Administration's legal and extralegal attempts to
rewrite national forest policy.
Mike Leahy is Natural Resources Counsel for the Defenders of Wildlife, focusing on litigation and policy related to species and habitat conservation on public lands. He was formerly Forest Campaign Director for the
National Audubon Society. He has a J.D. and a B.S. in Natural Resources.
William J. (Bill) Snape III, is vice president and chief counsel at Defenders of Wildlife, a biodiversity advocacy group with approximately
one million members and supporters, dedicated to protecting plants and
animals in their native ecosystems. In this capacity, he oversees all domestic and international legal programs, provides legal counsel on all program
policy, and directs the organization's litigation before various courts and
tribunals. Snape is the author of numerous articles on natural resources
policy, and is the editor of BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW (Island Press
1996). Snape has taught at several law schools, including American University, Georgetown University, George Washington University, and the
University of Pennsylvania. Snape is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the
University of California, Los Angeles, with a B.A. in History, magna cum
laude, and received his J.D. from George Washington University, where
he was president of the Environmental Law Society. He serves on the
board for the U.S. Endangered Species Coalition, where he is president
and chairman, the Institute for Journalism and Natural Resources, and
Wild Canada.Net.
This is the second Article of the Judicial Accountability Project to appear in ELR's News & Analysis. The first, Weakening NEPA: How the
Bush Administration Uses the Judicial System to Weaken Environmental
Protections, 33 ELR 10682 (July 2003), detailed the Bush Administration's attempts to weaken NEPA in federal court litigation.
1. The full methodology utilized for the project and report is contained
in Appendix A.

The focus ofthis Article is the laws, regulations, and rules
that govern the management of national forests. The National Forest System is composed of 155 national forests
and 20 national grasslands. These lands cover roughly 8%
of the country, 191 million acres in 42 states. They provide a
wide range of values and services, including vital wildlife
habitats, ecosystem services like clean water and air, irreplaceable recreation opportunities, and timber and
nontimber resources. The National Forest System includes
a wide range of natural plant and animal communities, including some of the most significant and important examples of native ecosystems. More than 17% of federally
threatened and endangered species and over 25% of species
not federally listed but recognized by scientists as imperiled
reside on national forests, more than on any other category
of federal lands. In addition to providing necessary habitat
for rare species, national forests support populations of
many more common species, providing an opportunity to
assure their long-term viability through proper forest management. National forests are particularly important for species such as wolves, grizzly bears, elk, lynx, wolverines, and
migratory birds that require large and relatively intact
blocks of habitat.
The laws, regulations, and policies governing management of national forests represent the culmination of decades of management experience and experimentation. A
delicate balance has been struck between competing interests of ecological, commercial, and recreational values
through a transparent governmental process in which public
participation is encouraged and respected. Most notably, the
requirements of the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA) and its implementing regulations require the U.S.
Forest Service (Forest Service) to "provide for the diversity
of plant and animal communities," "maintain viable populations of existing native and desirable non-native vertebrate
species," and provide for and encourage public input into
Forest Service decisions. True political conservatism would
behave very cautiously with regard to altering the legal
framework that protects such important national reservoirs
of ancient trees, clean water, and abundant wildlife.
The current Forest Service, however, under the leadership of former timber industry lobbyist Mark Rey, who now
oversees the agency in his appointed position as U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment, has systematically sought
to evade or minimize the requirements of the NFMA and
2. PREcious HERITAGE: THE STATUS OF BIODIVERSITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 280 (Bruce A. Stein et al. eds., Oxford University

Press 2000). See also DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BIODIVERSITY AND
NATIONAL FORESTS (2002) availableat http://www.defenders.org/
forests/bioforest.pdf.
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other forest laws and regulations. The Forest Service was
the defendant in lawsuits challenging forest policy or management decisions 61 times in the first 2 years of the Bush
Administration. In the 46 decided cases in which the Administration presented arguments that reached substantive
forest management issues, the Bush Administration presented arguments hostile to accepted interpretations of forest law, regulation, or rules 31 times or 67% of the time. Despite the high degree of deference that administrative agencies receive from reviewing courts, the Bush Administration prevailed in only three of its forest-law-hostile arguments. This represents a 90% failure rate by the Bush Administration when it presents forest-law-hostile arguments
and displays with some clarity the unlawfulness of the vast
majority of the Administration's actions and arguments.
By contrast, the Bush Administration won all of the 15
cases in which it presented arguments consistent with (neutral or positive to) forest law, regulation, and rules a 100%
success rate when the Administration acts to uphold forest
law. Twelve of these arguments (26%) were neutral in that
the Bush Administration merely followed the law despite an
outcome that did not demonstrably further the goals of forest management. Only 3 ofthese arguments (7%) were positive in that the Bush Administration actively defended the
goals of forest management. 3
In sum, the arguments of the Bush Administration in
court are overwhelmingly hostile to most rules protecting
national forests and the many natural resources in them. At
the same time, the Bush Administration is currently engaged in a broad, coordinated, sustained effort to rewrite decades of federal forest policy in order to eliminate requirements that the Forest Service has been held accountable and
to promote an industry-friendly ideology.4 The Administration has made largely forest-hostile arguments in court, and
when these arguments have been rejected by the courts, it
has proposed changes in the law to the U.S. Congress and
initiated many administrative changes for which congressional approval is unnecessary. The sweeping changes being proposed and implemented by the Bush Administration
represent a comprehensive and radical shift in our nation's
forest policies and the end of the modem era of forest management, which began in the 1970s and emphasizes a
greater appreciation of nontimber values and accountability
to the public. The emphasis of these changes is on weakening the laws, regulations, and policies related to biodiversity, ecological protections, environmental impacts, sci3. These results are consistent with the results from the first Article of
the Judicial Accountability Project on the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). William Snape & John Carter, Weakening
NEPA: How the Bush Administration Uses the Judicial System to
Weaken Environmental Protections, 33 ELR 10682 (July 2003).
That Article found that of the 172 applicable NEPA-decided cases
argued by Bush Administration lawyers and not overturned on appeal, the Administration's arguments prevailed 95 times, or 55% of
the time. In 94 cases, or 54% of the total, the Bush Administration
presented arguments that could best be defined as NEPA-hostile in
that they were contrary to established statutory, regulatory, or judicial interpretations of NEPA. The Bush Administration lost 73 out of
94 of its NEPA-hostile arguments, or 78% of the time. When the
Bush Administration presented NEPA-consistent arguments, it was
successful in 75 out of 78 cases, or 96% of the time. See Appendix A.
For a more complete discussion of the numerical results of the study,
see generally Appendix B.
4. See

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, PROPOSED BUSH

NFMA

REGULA-

TIONS MIRROR LOGGING COMPANIES' AGENDA (2002), availableat

http://www.defenders.org/forests/forest/new/wishlist.html.

12-2003

ence, and public participation. This Article concludes that
the Bush Administration has already substantially advanced
its forest-law-hostile agenda by pursuing changes in all
three branches of our federal government: the courts, Congress, and executive agencies.
Legal Framework for National Forests
National forests must be managed in accordance with a
broad range of laws, a subset of which deals specifically
with forest resources. A brief overview of the legal, regulatory, and policy landscape overlaying national forest management follows.
ForestService OrganicAct
The Organic Administration Act (Organic Act) of 1897 created the National Forest System out of a system of forest reserves authorized in 189 1.5 The Organic Act set the original
purposes of national forests: "No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within
the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the 6use and necessities of the citizens of the
United States."
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (Multiple Use Act)
Congress enacted the Multiple Use Act in 1960 to improve
management of the National Forest System and to further
clarify its purposes. The Multiple Use Act builds on the purposes set in the Organic Act: "National Forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.,7
The Multiple Use Act requires national forests to be managed in such a way that the productivity ofthe land is not impaired, the values of all resources are considered, economic
returns are not emphasized to the exclusion of other values,
and all resources are managed in a sustainable manner.
The NFMA
Not satisfied with the limited changes brought about by the
Multiple Use Act and facing growing public concern over
aggressive clearcutting practices by the Forest Service,
Congress enacted the NFMA in 1976 as further reform legislation.8 Congress sought to address many issues through
the NFMA, specifically clearcutting and the protection of
biological diversity. 9
5. Forest Reserves Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, §24, 26 Stat. 1095,
1103 (repealed at 16 U.S.C. §471 (1976)).
6. Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §475 (2003).
7. Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16U.S.C. §528(2003).
8. 16 U.S.C. §§1600-1687, ELR STAT. NFMA §§2-16. Charles F.
Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planningin
the NationalForests, 64 OR. L. REV. 69 (1985).
9. See, e.g., id. at 70 (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 5619 (1976)) (NFMA
sponsor Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) stated: "The days have
ended when the forest may be viewed only as trees and trees viewed
only as timber. The soil and the water, the grasses and the shrubs, the
fish and the wildlife, and the beauty that is the forest must become integral parts of resource mangers' thinking and actions."; Sen. Floyd
Haskell (D-Colo.) stated: the protection of nontimber resources
"must be assigned as great a priority in any forest management policy as the production of timber").
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One of the issues Congress faced was extraordinary Forest Service autonomy, a "Trust us!" philosophy at the agency that held that only agency officials had the knowledge
and expertise to make decisions about forest management.
The public was largely left out of the process, while the
agency experts "managed" forests with massive clearcuts.
Most old growth forests were sold off and razed, many species were driven away sometimes toward extinction-and
many waterways were clogged as a result of erosion, to mentionjust a few painful legacies ofthe "Trust us!" approach.
Congress set out to offset agency independence by opening up forest management to the public. The NFMA democratized national forest management, allowing the public to
participate in not just individual projects such as timber
sales, but also in the overall management direction for a national forest. The main tool employed by NFMA authors to
increase agency accountability was the forest plan. The
NFMA requires each national forest to develop, maintain,
and implement with public input a forest plan that govems how the forest will be managed for up to 15 years. 10
Forest plans and the public's participation in developing
them were given meaning with a "consistency" requirement
that all actions on the forest comply with the plan."
Another way Congress reformed national forest management through the NFMA was by providing direction for
how forest resources were to be managed. With regard to
wildlife and biodiversity, the NFMA specifically requires
the Forest Service to maintain biodiversity on national forests. The NFMA requires implementing regulations that
"provide for diversity of plant and animal communities
based on the suitability and capability of the specific land2
area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives."'
Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations relied on the
recommendations of a Committee of Scientists to craft final
regulations for implementing the NFMA. The Reagan Administration recognized that the "diversity of plant and animal communities" could not be maintained if the individual
species making up those communities are lost. President
Ronald Reagan therefore adopted the "population viability" rule that the Forest Service must "maintain viable populations of existing native and desirable non-native vertebrate species" on each national forest. 13 The viability rule
tells the Forest Service it cannot do such a poorjob managing national forests that it drives native species away. The
1982 regulations also established a mechanism to measure
compliance with the viability standard and gauge the impacts of implementing forest plans by requiring surveys of
representative "management indicator species" that "indicate the effects of management activities" and "best represent the issues, concerns and opportunities to support recovery of Federally-listed species, provide continued viability
of sensitive
species, and enhance management of wildlife
14
and fish."'
10. 16 U.S.C. §1604.
11. Id. §1604(i); see, e.g., Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d
1146, 1151,28 ELR21044 (9th Cir. 1998); Idaho Sporting Congress
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239 (D. Idaho 1996),
aff'd, 122 F.3d 1071 (9thCir. 1997) ("[A forest plan] establishes forest-wide and area-specific standards and guidelines to which all projects within that National Forest must adhere for up to 15 years.").
12. 16 U.S.C. §1604(g)(3)(B).
13. 36 C.F.R. §219.19 (2003).
14. Id. §219.19(a)(1); Forest Service Manual 2621.1.

The NFMA's positive effect was not immediate, and significant forest degradation occurred in the 1980s. But over
time, as forest plans were finalized, implemented, amended,
and slowly revised, the reform objectives of the NFMA began to be realized. The reforms could be seen in substantial
public involvement in forest plan development, and in forest
plans that increasingly recognized and valued nontimber
forest resources in addition to timber. Many other factors
and laws contributed heavily to changes in forest management, but the requirements of the NFMA, particularly to involve the public in long-range forest planning and to maintain biodiversity and other nontimber resources, were important factors in bringing about positive change.
In 1997, the USDA, which includes the Forest Service,
called upon a new Committee of Scientists to guide a revision of the regulations. After three years ofpublic and scientific input and meetings, regulations based on consideration
of the committee's recommendations were finalized in
2000.15 The timber industry railed heavily against them,
calling them a "tyranny of science" and, among other criticisms, complaining that the "proposed rules create far too
many 'thou shall' edicts that will lead to greater
judicial in,,16
terference in national forest management.
Five months
after entering office and seven months after the regulations
took effect, the Bush Administration summarily suspended
the 2000 regulations without prior public notice or comment. 17 In December 2002, the Bush Administration proposed rewritten NFMA regulations that responded directly
to at least eight ofthe timber industry's specific concerns.
Appeals Reform Act
The Forest Service has had an appeals process almost since
its inception. 18 Appeals of agency decisions to higher-ups
within the agency give the agency and interested parties an
opportunity to resolve disputes without resorting to formal
court action. In 1992, however, the USDA stopped taking
administrative appeals of Forest Service decisions. 9 This
decision drew sharp congressional and public criticism, including more than 30,000 public comments. 0 Congress
quickly moved to reinstate Forest Service appeals by enacting the Appeals Reform Act, signed into law on October 5,
1992, by President George H.W. Bush.2
15. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), National Forest System
Land and Resource Management Planning; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
67513 (Nov. 9, 2000) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 217, 219).
16. Testimony of Steven P. Quarles, American Forest and Paper Association, May 10, 2000, Before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; American Forest and Paper Association, comments on draft NFMA regulations, Feb. 2, 2000 (also complaining
that the 2000 rules "reflect every scientist's desire for the best quality
data"; disparaging an ecological sustainability standard as "alien to
the history and tradition of the Forest Service"; and arguing timber
production should not be limited to "achieving social or economic
purposes," but can continue "up to a point of 'substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land."').
17. USDA, National Forest System Land and Resource Management
Planning; Extension of Compliance Deadline, 66 Fed. Reg. 27551
(May 17, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 27554 (May 17, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg.
35431 (May 20,2002) (all to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.35(b)).
18. Bradley C. Bobertz & Robert L. Fischman, Administrative Appeal
Reform: The Case of the ForestService, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 371,

375 (1993).
19. Id. at 392-93.
20. Id. at 394.
21. Pub. L. No. 102-381, §322, 106 Stat. 1373, 1419 (1992).

33 ELR 10962

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

12-2003

Copyright © 2003 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC.reprinted with permission from ELR®, hug://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

Congress has historically advocated on behalf of forest
appeals in order to guarantee the public, as well as the
agency itself, an opportunity for oversight of agency decisions and a chance to resolve disputes and correct mistakes
without hiring a lawyer and going to federal court. Congress
realized the opportunity to comment on agency decisions,
while extremely important, was not sufficient by itself to
provide the desired level of public involvement in national
forest management; an action-forcing component was
needed. Congress therefore required not only notice-andcomment procedures on all forest management actions, but
also an appeals process. The Bush Administration has recently announced restrictive changes to the present appeals rules that are discussed in the public participation
section, below.
NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act (NEPA)
NEPA requires federal agencies to take a "hard look" at the
environmental consequences of their actions and to consider reasonable alternatives to proposed actions.22 NEPA
"law" derives from three main sources: NEPA itself, which
is a rather brief statute; Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations, which contain provisions for implementing NEPA and action-forcing mechanisms to ensure
agency compliance; and NEPA-implementing regulations
and guidelines promulgated by individual federal agencies
such as the Forest Service.
In some instances, the culmination of the NEPA process
is the preparation of an environmental impact statement
(EIS), which is supposed to be a thorough and searching review of all of the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts associated with a contemplated federal agency action.
An EIS requires the generation and review of all available
relevant scientific evidence and the formulation and consideration of alternatives and makes such information available to the public. Where applicable regulations do not mandate the agency's preparation of an EIS for a certain type of
action, the agency must still review the proposed action to
determine whether the environmental impacts are significant enough to require the preparation of an EIS. This process normally begins with an environmental assessment
(EA). Although generally not as detailed as an EIS, an EA
must provide a thorough examination of the environmental
impacts of a proposed action and provide and evaluate alternatives. If the EA concludes the impacts of the proposed action will be significant, an EIS must be prepared. If not, a
finding of no significant impact is issued, and the action can
proceed without further NEPA analysis unless that conclusion is successfully challenged.
In certain instances, agencies may avoid the preparation
of either an EA or an EIS in considering the environmental
impacts of a proposed federal action. An agency may adopt
a "categorical exclusion" where it has made a specific determination that the category of action at issue will have no appreciable effect individually or cumulatively on the envi23
ronment.
This determination
provideexcluded
for "extraordinary circumstances"
in which must
a normally
action
22. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370d, ELR STAT. NEPA §§2-209. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21, 6 ELR 20532 n.21 (1976) (citing
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837, 2
ELR 20029 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
23. 40 C.F.R. §1508.4 (2003).

might have a significant impact and require further NEPA
analysis.24 The categorical exclusion clause was enacted as
part ofNEPA to allow small, routine projects with no significant environmental impacts to proceed without being subject to the environmental impact analyses otherwise required under NEPA. The Bush Administration has recently
attempted to increase the use and scope of categorical exclusions as discussed in the wildfire section, below.
EndangeredSpecies Act (ESA)
The ESA generally mandates that federal agencies conserve
threatened and endangered wildlife, and that they not act in a
manner that puts listed species at risk. Section 7(a)(1) of
ESA requires that federal agencies act to further the goals of
ESA. Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies proposing an
action that "may affect" an endangered species to "consult"
with either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), depending on
the species, on potential unacceptable impacts to the species
and ways to mitigate those impacts. The first step is for the
agency proposing the action to request information about
the presence of any listed species within the proposal area. If
a listed species is found within the proposal area, the action
agency must prepare a biological assessment (BA). If it is
found through the BA that the project is likely to adversely
affect a protected species, the action agency must then engage in formal consultation with the FWS or the NMFS. After formal consultation, the FWS or the NMFS must issue a
biological opinion assessing the impact of the project on the
species. If the determination of the biological opinion is that
the activity will jeopardize an endangered species or degrade its critical habitat, the FWS or the NMFS makes a
"jeopardy determination." This determination is significant
in that once it is issued, the action agency must develop reasonable and prudent alternatives, or measures, to help conserve the species. The Bush Administration has proposed
changes that would substantially weaken the Forest Service's §7 obligations under the ESA.26
The Bush Administration's Anti-Forest Agenda
The Bush Administration has embarked on an across-theboard campaign to remake federal forest policy to reflect its
industry-friendly ideology. The forest law court cases argued by the U.S. Department of Justice since the Bush Administration took office in many instances foreshadow the
on-the-ground and policy actions of the Forest Service.
Many of the specific rules that the Bush Administration is
attempting to rewrite are rules that have been successfully
enforced in federal court to prevent the Forest Service from
carrying out actions that violate federal environmental laws.
The court arguments and policy actions by which the Bush
Administration has attempted to rewrite forest law have
been placed into four categories for this Article: (1) Rolling
Back NFMA Planning Rules; (2) Using Wildfires to Eliminate Environmental Protections; (3) Denying Meaningful
Public Participation; and (4) Gutting Roadless Area and
Wilderness Protections.
24. Id.; Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100
F.3d 1443, 1446, 27 ELR 20455 (9th Cir. 1996).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR STAT. ESA §§2-18.
26. Id. §1536.
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Rolling Back NFMA PlanningRules
The Bush Administration's most comprehensive and farreaching proposal is the revision of the rules for implementing forest planning and projects under the NFMA. These
regulations govern every action on every acre of the 191million-acre National Forest System. Forest planning is the
cornerstone of the NFMA, the mechanism through which
the reforms embodied in that law are to be realized and the
main avenue for public involvement in public forest management. The regulations proposed by the Bush Administration undercut the purpose and language of the NFMA by
attempting to eliminate all mandatory requirements that a
plaintiff or court could enforce against the agency. The proposed regulations would allow forest managers unfettered
discretion to manage the public's forests however they see
fit, with only vague, unenforceable guidelines to direct their
actions. The proposed regulations mark a return to the
"Trust us!" days when the agency was wholly unaccountable to the public for its actions. Two examples pertaining
to wildlife management and forest plans bear this out.
Eliminating the Wildlife Viability Requirement
As discussed above, one ofthe NFMA's most important provisions is the requirement to maintain the natural diversity
of plant and animal communities on national forests. 2 This
has always been interpreted as requiring the maintenance of
the "viability"
ofindividual species that make up those com28
munities. The management of land in such a way that native species are not driven off is a baseline requirement that
should apply to all public land management. It sets a floor
below which public land management should not fall. Surveys for representative species that indicate the likely impacts of forest management have also always been required,
providing a helpful shortcut for gauging the effectiveness of
29
forest management without having to monitor all species.
These requirements provide early warning of species that
may be in decline and a mechanism to adjust management
practices and arrest declines before species decline to a
point where they need to be listed under the ESA and more
drastic and costly recovery actions must be taken. These
regulations also seek to maintain species on all national forests where they naturally occur, lowering the risk a species
will be reduced to a fraction of its range as wolves and grizzlies, for example, have been.
The requirement to retain populations of native wildlife
on national forests was put in place by the Reagan Administration. The Clinton Administration modified the viability
rule to make it more flexible and easier for the Forest Service to meet. 3° The Clinton Administration's changes were
not enough to satisfy industry critics or the Bush Administration, however, which is intent on eliminating all minimum standards for wildlife management. The Bush Admin27.
28.
29.
30.

16 U.S.C. §1604(g)(3)(B).
36 C.F.R. §219.19 (2003).
Id. §219.19(a)(1).
The 2000 regulations required a "high likelihood" of "supporting
over time the viability of native and desired non-native species well
distributed throughout their ranges within the plan area," with lower
standards for situations beyond the agency's control, naturally rare
species, and previously degraded landscapes. 65 Fed. Reg. at 67575
(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.20(b)(2)).

istration has proposed to do away with the viability rule and
eliminate all mandatory requirements to maintain or monitor wildlife on national forests beyond those required under
the ESA for the most troubled species. 31 Ironically, these
forest management changes make it far more likely that
growing numbers of species will require ESA protection.
The Forest Service repeatedly attempted to avoid adherence to the viability rule and related wildlife surveys in
court, even before the Bush Administration moved formally
to eliminate the legal requirement of viability. These attempts have largely been rejected by the courts. For example, the Forest Service has attempted to short-circuit the viability rule requirements in an effort to meet industry demand
for old growth trees by magically converting sections of
young forest to old growth forest for monitoring purposes.
In Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse,32 the
Forest Service was sued by environmental groups who alleged that the Lightning Ridge and Long Prong timber sales
in the Boise National Forest were approved in violation of
NEPA and the NFMA. The environmental groups argued
that the Forest Service failed to comply with the NFMA
standard for assessing the viability of populations of old
growth-dependent species potentially affected by the sales.
Specifically, they contested the Boise Forest Plan's "proxy
on proxy" shortcut to monitoring the viability of old
growth-dependent species: monitoring only habitat used by
management indicator species without ascertaining actual
population data. Plaintiffs further asserted that the Forest
Service's survey efforts violated even this invalid standard.
The Forest Service claimed that it could continue approving
logging activities despite any failure to comply with the invalid proxy on proxy standard in the forest plan because of a
clause in a forest plan monitoring report, which stated that
"unless habitat was extensively changed through wild-fire
or management activities viability for old growth-dependent species was not threatened." The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the basis of a
factual record that showed substantial changes in the
amount of old growth habitat available. The court stated:
[T]he Monitoring Report shows that the ForestService s
methodology does not reasonablyensure viablepopula-

tions of the species at issue.... the Forest Service's
methodology for dedicating old growth is so inaccurate
that it turns out there is no old growth at all in management area 35, where the ForestService has purportedto
dedicate 1,280 acres of old growth.3

Because the blocks of habitat chosen for monitoring by the
Forest Service in fact contained 40% less old growth than
indicated, the court held that monitoring such habitat as a
proxy for determining the population of species dependent
on old growth was invalid. The court set aside both sales.
The Bush Administration has also stretched the meaning
of "salvage sale" in order to cut more healthy trees from
public forests. Frequently such salvage sales are approved
to cut both damaged and undamaged trees in an area. Salvage sales are timber sales by another name and frequently
31. See USDA, National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Proposed Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 72769, 72799 (Dec. 6,
2002) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219.13) (presenting two options for maintaining diversity, neither of which require any species
to be maintained or monitored).
32. 305 F.3d 957, 33 ELR 20031 (9th Cir. 2002).
33. Id. at 968 (emphasis added).
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require the same equipment and infrastructure, remove
many of the same live trees, and have the same impacts as
"regular" timber sales.
In Utah Environmental Congress v. Zieroth,34 the Forest
Service was sued over its approval of the South Manti timber sale in the Manti-La Sal National Forest in Utah. The
timber sale was described as a salvage project to log spruce
trees killed by spruce beetles. NFMA regulations required
the Forest Service to assess the viability of species dependent on mature trees prior to approving the sale. Plaintiffs
challenged the absence of adequate population data for the
blue grouse, the designated management indicator species
for mature timber-dependent species within the forest. The
Forest Service first argued that the dead spruce to be harvested under the sale did not meet the definition of "mature
timber" and therefore categorically could have no effect on
the viability of the mature timber-dependent grouse. The
court, however, noted that the sale would include healthy
mature timber interspersed with the dead spruce and rejected this argument. Next the Forest Service attempted to
change the management indicator species it was required to
monitor from the blue grouse to the northern goshawk,
which would not be significantly impacted by the sale, on
the basis that it could not gather data on the "reclusive" blue
grouse. The court rejected this argument as well, stating:
"The court concludes that the datawas available,the Forest
Service just decided not to collect it. ' Accordingly, the
court reversed the Forest Service's approval of the timber
salvage project.
The Bush Administration has also sought to render timber
sale challenges moot by temporarily withdrawing them
without committing to cancel the project or address plaintiff
concerns. The Forest Service has approved unlawful timber
sales and allowed cutting to commence, withdrawing approval in the face of legal challenges in order to avoid court
decisions. Sometimes, the cutting is concluded before a
court may hear the case, leaving litigants without an effective remedy. Often, the Bush Administration attempts to resubmit the challenged sales once the threat of litigation has
abated. The goal of this strategy is to allow unlawful timber
sales to proceed while perpetually evading judicial review. 36
In Bighorn Forest Users Coalition, Inc. v. Thompson,3
the Forest Service was sued over its decision to authorize a
timber sale for which it had not gathered or considered data
on management indicator species within the sale area or determined a valid allowable sale quantity of timber that could
be cut from the forest. The Forest Service responded by voluntarily withdrawing its approval of the timber sale and
moved to dismiss the action as moot. In order for the case to
be legally moot, the court found that it must be "absolutely
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. 3 8 The Forest Service's evidence
of the plan's moomess was a declaration by the regional for34. 190 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Utah 2002).
35. Id. at 1271 (emphasis added).
36. In Willow Creek Ecology v. U.S. Forest Serv., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1312,
33 ELR 20072 (D. Utah 2002), the unlawful authorization of a timber sale was found moot because trees had already been cut. In Conservation Action Project v. Moore, No. 02-193-JD, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24351 (D.N.H. Dec. 18, 2002), the Forest Service withdrew
its authorization of a timber sale and the court dismissed NEPA challenges as moot.
37. 170 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Colo. 2001).
38. Id. at 1093.
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ester that he "may or may not reissue a decision" on the
Sourdough Timber Sale and that he has "no present schedule for issuing a new decision., 39 The court held that this evidence did not support a finding of moomess, asserting that
the regional forester at no point indicated that he would remedy the omission alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. The
court found "the Forest Service's withdrawal of its Sourdough Timber Sale decision does not preclude itfrom reissuing a decision with the exact same allegedfailings once
this action is dismissed.
Under these circumstances the ac40
tion is not moot.
Making Forest Plans Unenforceable, Meaningless
The NFMA requires that "[r]esource plans and permits,
contracts, and other instruments for the use and occupancy
of National Forest System lands shall be consistent with the
land management plans.",41 Both the 1982 and 2000 regulations interpreted this NFMA "consistency" requirement as
written: that all agency actions must be consistent with the
governing forest plan.42 The consistency requirement has
been regularly enforced by courts to hold the Forest Service
accountable to forest plans established with public input.43
The Bush Administration has responded with regulation
changes to make compliance with forest plans optional. Its
proposed regulations state that forest plan "[s]tandards
should be adaptable, '44 and seek to allow projects inconsistent with forest plans to go forward by granting the Forest
Service authority to exempt projects from plan standards or
modify plan standards through a project. The Bush Administration further seeks to establish the unenforceability
of forest plans by parroting U.S. Supreme Court language in
its proposed rule. The Court held that specific provisions in
one forest plan were not ripe for court review because they
did not "command anyone to do anything or to refrain from
doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify any
formal legal license, power or authority; they do not subject
anyone to any civil or criminal liability; they create no legal
rights or obligations. 46 The Bush Administration is at39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

44.
45.

46.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
16 U.S.C. §1604(i).
The 1982 regulations require that forest managers "shall ensure that
...
all outstanding and future permits, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other instruments for occupancy and use of affected lands
are consistent with the plan." 36 C.F.R. §219.10(e). The 2000 regulations required that "all site-specific decisions, including authorized uses of land, must be consistent with the applicable plan." 65
Fed. Reg. at 67571 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.10).
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971,991, 32 ELR
20618 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Northwoods Wilderness Recovery v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 323 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussed below); see
also Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1151, 28
ELR 21044 (9th Cir. 1998); Idaho Sporting Congress v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239 (D. Idaho 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d
1071 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A forest plan] establishes forest-wide and
area-specific standards and guidelines to which all projects within
that National Forest must adhere for up to 15 years.").
67 Fed. Reg. at 72796 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219.4)
"If a proposed site-specific project or action would not be consistent
with the standards of the plan, the Responsible Official may ...[a] s
part of the project decision, amend the plan to modify one or more
standards or to exempt applicationof one or more standardsto the
project or action to allow for its implementation." 67 Fed. Reg. at
72798 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.10(d)) (emphasis added).
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 28 ELR 21119
(1998).
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tempting to administratively expand this limited holding to
make entire forest plans unreviewable by writing it into
regulation: "The direction in a plan does not normally create, authorize, or execute any ground-disturbing activity.
A plan, in and of itself, does not grant, withhold, or modify
any contract, permit, or other legal instrument, does not
subject anyone to civil or criminal liability, and creates no
legal rights."4
In a recent decision that displays the Bush Administration's vision of the future, the Forest Service argued that in
approving a timber sale the only requirement it had to comply with was the allowable sale quantity, which sets an upper
limit on the amount of trees that can be cut from a national
forest. So long as it does not exceed this maximum amount
of timber it is allowed to remove from a forest, the Bush Administration argues it is bound by no restrictions on the manner in which the timber is removed.
In Northwoods Wilderness Recovery v. U.S. Forest Service, 48 the Forest Service approved a timber sale in the Ottawa National Forest in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. Environmental groups asserted that the sale violated the forest
plan by greatly exceeding the annual acreage limitations on
timber harvests within the specific area of the forest it would
impact. The Forest Service argued that despite any inconsistencies with the forest plan's requirements for managing the
area the timber sale was in, the total amount of timber to be
removed from the forest as a whole still fell below the allowable sale quantity authorized by the plan. Because the sale
would not exceed the total allowable sale quantity for the
forest, any further requirements under the plan were irrelevant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this approach stating: "In our view, the Allowable
Sale Quantitywas not meant to be the only limitationon timberproduction in the Forest.Allowable Sale Quantity does
not measure the impacts of logging on wildlife, vegetation,
soils, and water quality, as required by the Forest Act. 4 9 Although ultimately overturning the decision of the district
court, the Sixth Circuit approved the lower court's discussion of the goal of the forest plan:
This plan does not have as its objective simply producing

a number of boardfeet of woodfor sawmills. It also has
as its objectiveprotectingthe water quality,the soil quality, the vegetation, the birds, thefish, the deer whatever

else is in there. To simply say we can go in and do whatever we want as long as we don't exceed a certain number ofboardfeet would seem to make 90percentofall of
the analysis in the plan unnecessary surplusage.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded
with instructions for the district court to enter summary
judgment in favor of the environmental groups challenging
the timber sale.
The Bush Administration has gone so far as to propose allowing forest managers to categorically exclude entire forest plans, as well as plan amendments, from the analysis of
47. 67 Fed. Reg. at 72795 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.2(d)).
48. 323 F.3d405 (6th Cir. 2003). This case was decidedMarch 21,2003,
and fell outside of the dates covered in this survey. Although it has
been included in the narrative summary to illustrate recent trends in
the litigation tactics of the Bush Administration, it has not been included in the case review database and is not reflected in the numeric assessment.
49. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
50. Id. (emphasis added).

their environmental impacts required by NEPA. 51 All previous administrations and courts have understood NEPA to
clearly apply to forest plans and significant amendments. 52
Categorical exclusions, as discussed earlier, were created so
agencies would not have to spend resources analyzing the
environmental impacts of small, insignificant projects that
clearly have no significant environmental effects. 53 The
Forest Service's list of categorical exclusions currently (and
historically) includes such usually minor actions as resurfacing parking lots, authorizing short-term use permits, and
maintaining administrative buildings.54 By contrast, the
Bush Administration has proposed the categorical exclusion of entire forest plans plans that determine every action on every acre of a national forest, which average over
1.2 million acres in size. This is an extreme position flatly
inconsistent with congressional intent behind the categorical exclusion process.
In reality, all forest plans create significant environmental impacts that must be analyzed in an EIS. Land allocations, allowable activities, levels and locations of activities, and cumulative impacts are established in the forest
plan. Analysis of the impacts ofthese decisions can only be
realistically done at the forest plan level by analyzing the
overall impacts stemming from a forest plan rather than relying solely on piecemeal assessments of individual projects implementing the plan. Exempting forest plans from
NEPA would allow many of the most significant forest
management decisions to forever escape environmental
review. It would also mean the Forest Service would only
present to the public its preferred forest plan rather than
having to consider alternative approaches as required under NEPA.
Prior to proposing to allow forest plans to be exempted
entirely from NEPA environmental analysis, a Bush Administration attempt to downplay the significance of forest
plan decisions and avoid analysis of their impacts was rejected in court. The court recognized the importance and impact of forest plan decisions and their cumulative environmental impacts.
In Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck,55 the Forest
Service was sued for violating NEPA and the NFMA in approving the Darroch-Eagle timber sale in the Gallatin National Forest in Montana. This sale was one of many proposed for the forest that included road construction, which
cumulatively would result in more roads than the forest plan
permitted. Rather than amend the forest plan and comprehensively consider the impacts of opening new roads, the
Forest Service was approving new road construction for individual timber sales by merely waiving the plan's road density standards for each individual sale. Without a road density waiver, the Forest Service would have been required to
close 11 miles of roads within the forest to offset the new
roads created pursuant to the Darroch-Eagle sale alone. The
51. 67 Fed. Reg. at 72797 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.6).
52. The 1982 regulations require, for example, development of the forest plan "and associated [EIS] required pursuant to the planning process." 36 C.F.R. §219.5(a)(5). The 2000 regulations required a "Notice of Intent to prepare an [EIS] to add, modify, remove, or continue
in effect the decisions embodied in the plan." 65 Fed. Reg. at 67571
(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.9(d)).
53. 40 C.F.R. §1508.4 (2003).
54. Forest Service Handbook 1909.15, 31.1 & 31.2 (1992).
55. 304 F.3d 886, 33 ELR 20042 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Forest Service argued that it need not consider the road density amendments it made for other sales in the EA for the
Darroch-Eagle timber sale because the amendments were
spread throughout the Gallatin National Forest and did not
affect conditions within the specific sale area. The court rejected this attempt by the Forest Service to ignore both the
road density standards contained in the forest plan and the
impacts of new road construction, stating:
[T]he national forest was the geographic unit within
which the Forest Service chose to set forth binding road
density standards in the Forest Plan. All of these sales are
proposed within the Gallatin National Forest and will
necessarily have additive effects within that management unit. Unless the cumulative impacts of these
amendments are subject to analysis even though distantly spaced throughout the Forest,the ForestService
will be free to amend roaddensity standards throughout
theforestpiecemeal,without ever having to evaluate
5 6 the
amendments' cumulative environmental impacts.
The court found both the EA and the biological assessment
for the sale inadequate, reversed the lower court ruling upholding the sale, and remanded with instructions to enjoin
the sale.
Arguing Against the Viability Rule and Forest Plans
Simultaneously
The Bush Administration has simultaneously pursued its
dual goals of rendering the wildlife viability rule and forest
plans themselves unenforceable on a number of occasions.
Courts have repeatedly rejected these arguments, but they
highlight a shell game the Forest Service plays to avoid environmental and judicial review. The agency argues that
environmental review of forest plans is not warranted because plans themselves do not actually result in any impacts. The agency claims that environmental impacts related to management decisions guided by a forest plan will
be reviewed at the project level, and plan provisions can be
challenged at a later date through project challenges. Then,
when defending its failure to comply with NFMA or forest
plan requirements in approving a specific project, the
agency argues that such requirements are not reviewable
because they apply only to plans, not projects. Under this
defense, any project-level challenge to NFMA requirements or forest plan standards would therefore be an
unreviewable programmatic challenge to the forest plan.
Using this circular logic, forest plans and plan decisions
could never be reviewed, and the wildlife viability rule
could never be enforced, which seems to be precisely the
intent. The Administration relies heavily on its expansive
interpretation of the Court's holding in Ohio Forestry
Ass 'n v. Sierra Club5 7 to bolster its claim that forest plans
are wholly unreviewable. The Bush Administration appears to read Ohio Forestry to mean forest plans are not
reviewable except in rare circumstances. The Court in
Ohio Forestry,however, held that the very specific provisions of the Wayne National Forest plan in Ohio that were
challenged were not ripe for court review yet, but clearly
acknowledged that other forest plan determinations with
more direct effect could be.
56. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
57. 523 U.S. 726, 28 ELR 21119 (1998).

In NeighborsofCuddy Mountain v. Alexander,5 8 environmental groups sued the Forest Service alleging violations of
the NFMA and NEPA in approval of the Grade/Dukes timber sale in the Payette National Forest in Idaho. The plaintiffs argued that the timber sale would not adequately protect
old growth-dependent species because the Forest Service
had not collected sufficient population data to comply with
the NFMA. The Bush Administration argued that the challenge to the timber sale alleging violations of the NFMA's
viability requirements was actually a challenge to
forestwide monitoring duties and unreviewable pursuant to
Ohio Forestry. The Forest Service attempted to interpret
OhioForestryto render its failure to comply with forestwide
viability and population monitoring requirements in approving individual timber sales unreviewable. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating:
Compliancewith NFMA 'sforest-widespecies viability requirements is relevant to the lawfulness ofany individual
timber sale. To hold otherwise would permit the Forest
Service to don blinders to the overall condition of a nationalforest each time it approved a sale, quite literally

losing sight of theforestfor the trees. This would contravene "one of the fundamental purposes of Congress in enacting [the NFMA]: that the National Forest System be5man9
aged with 'a systematic interdisciplinary approach.'
The Ninth Circuit accordingly reversed the dismissal of
the lower court and remanded the case for adjudication on
the merits.
In Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund v. Forsgren,60 the Forest Service failed to include any specific standards or directions for protection of the federally threatened
lynx in the forest plan for the Wallowa-Whitman National
Forest in Northeast Oregon. In approving three timber sales
in the forest, the Forest Service claimed that its ESA and
NFMA viability responsibilities were satisfied by a separate
document, the nationwide Lynx Conservation Assessment
and Strategy (LCAS), even though that document was specifically never intended to satisfy any legal requirements
and was created without any public involvement. When the
failure to even consider any impacts to the lynx was challenged in federal court, the Forest Service claimed that this
challenge to the timber sales was actually a programmatic
challenge to the forest plan and barred under Ohio Forestry.
The court held that the agency could not sidestep the NFMA
with unrelated documents, but rather had to incorporate the
LCAS into the forest plan. The court stated: "The Revised
LCAS and new mapping direction are procedurallyflawed
underNFMA because ofthe lack ofpublic involvement. Defendants' determination of viability based on these procedurally-flawed agency actions, therefore, was not reasonable. The court enjoined the three timber sales at issue.
In Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service,62 environmental groups challenged authorization of the McGaffey
58. 303 F.3d 1059, 33 ELR 20043 (9th Cir. 2002).
59. Id. at 1069-70 (emphasis added).
60. 252 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 33 ELR 20184 (D. Or. 2003). This case was
decided March 11, 2003, and fell outside of the dates covered in this
survey. Although it has been included in the narrative summary to illustrate recent trends in the litigation tactics of the Bush Administration, it has not been included in the case review database and is not
reflected in the numeric assessment.
61. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
62. 180 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D.N.M. 2001).
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Timber Sale in the Cibola National Forest in New Mexico,
alleging the Forest Service had not collected sufficient data
about the population trends of various management indicator species to fulfill the NFMA's viability regulations. The
Forest Service argued that the NFMA viability regulations
applied only to the establishment of forest plans and did not
apply to site-specific actions like timber sales. The court
found that the Forest Service's obligations under the population monitoring requirements continued throughout the
plan's existence to assure compliance with the plan: "To
avoid an absurdresult.., the NationalForestManagement
Act and the implementing regulations at issue apply to site
specifc projects.,,63 The court also rejected the Bush Administration's attempt to skip surveys for management indicator species (MIS) and rely only on habitat data, finding
that MIS surveys are already a shortcut for assessing wildlife viability and that the agency specifically picked MIS
species for the purpose of surveying populations:
The ForestService was obligated as a matter of law to
acquire and analyze population data (both actual and
trend)for the five management indicatorspecies in the
McGaffey Sale project area before renderinga decision

on theproject.., consequently, there is generally no reason to further short-cut the management monitoring process by relying only on habitat trends to p4roject management indicator species population data.
The court found that the record contained insufficient
hard population data, only unsupported conclusory statements, and rejected the Forest Service's attempt to ignore
its responsibilities.
Other Proposed NFMA Regulation Changes
The Bush Administration has proposed a number of other
changes to the NFMA planning regulations, which reflect
an agenda of reducing environmental protections, public
oversight, and scientific input. The Bush regulations would
turn management of forest uses on its head by creating an
explicit presumption that all national forest lands are open
to all uses except those specifically prohibited.65 This "open
unless posted closed" policy would undermine the efforts
of many local forest managers to manage such contentious
issues as motorized recreation with "closed unless posted
open" policies.
The Bush Administration's proposed NFMA regulations
are also noteworthy for what they leave out. The proposed
rule rejects the Committee of Scientists' recommendation to
make ecological sustainability the cornerstone of forest
management by eliminating the priority given to ecological
63. Ild.
at 1280 (emphasis added).
64. Ild.
at 1281-82 (emphasis added).
65.
National Forest System lands are generally suitable for a variety of uses such as outdoor recreation, livestock grazing, timber harvest, energy resource development, mining activities,
watershed restoration, cultural and heritage interpretation,
and other uses. Rather than determine the suitability of all
lands for all uses, a plan should assume that all lands are potentially suitable for a variety of uses except when specific areas are identified and determined not to be suited for one or
more uses.

sustainability in the 2000 regulations.66 This approach was
based on a recognition that economic and social
sustainability cannot be achieved in national forest management if the ecosystems on which they depend are not sustained. The proposed regulation leaves out a simple costbenefit assessment in the 2000 regulations that required the
costs of timber production to be justified by ecological, social, or economic benefits, contending "this requirement
goes far beyond the statutory language of [the] NFMA. 6 A
provision in the 2000 regulations allowing forest managers
the flexibility to give roadless areas on their national forests
a level of protection short of wilderness designation but
greater than roaded areas was left behind. 68 Another promising provision of the 2000 regulations that will be discarded
requires a "reasonable expectation that anticipated funding
is adequate to complete any required monitoring and evaluation prior to authorizing a site-specific action." 69 The 1982
regulations requiring that "off-road vehicle use shall be
planned and implemented to protect land and other resources, promote public safety, and minimize conflicts with
other uses of the National Forest System lands" would be repealed, as would requirements that "forest planning shall
evaluate the potential effects of vehicle use off-roads and...
classify areas and trails of National Forest System lands7 as
to whether or not off-road vehicle use may be permitted.", 0
Using Wildfires to EliminateEnvironmentalProtections
The Bush Administration is using the fear of inevitable and
frequently positive wildfires as cover to pursue a long-held
industry goal of eliminating environmental protections and
public oversight on national forests. This Administration
has come up with an innovative way to "fight" wildfires by
cutting the public out of forest management decisions. In
fact, rather than proposing an on-the-ground strategy, President Bush's flagship forest policy the Healthy Forests Initiative (HFI) focuses almost exclusively on eliminating
public involvement and government transparency in forest
management decisions as a means of fire prevention. Further, there is no effort on the part of this Administration to
focus limited fire prevention resources in and around communities where they will be most effective in protecting
lives and property. Instead, there is an insistence on allowing fire-prevention projects deep in forests far from communities where they are likely to be ineffective unless based on
carefully developed ecological criteria, which they are not.
The Administration pursues this misguided strategy in
spite of numerous reports documenting that public participation is not the cause of the Forest Service's inability to adequately manage wildfires. 7 1 To the contrary, public in66. The 2000 regulations state "the first priority for stewardship of the
national forests and grasslands is to maintain or restore ecological
sustainability to provide a sustainable flow of uses, values, products,
and services from these lands." 65 Fed. Reg. at 67574 (to be codified
at 36 C.F.R. §219.19).
67. 67 Fed. Reg. at 72790.
68. 65 Fed. Reg. at 67571 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.9(b)(8)).
69. ld. at 67572 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.11(b)).
70. 36 C.F.R. §219.21(g).

71. U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), FOREST SERVICE:
INFORMATION ON DECISIONS INVOLVING FUELS REDUCTION ACTIVITIES (2003) (GAO-03-689R) (more than 95% of fuel reduction

projects were ready for implementation within the standard 90-day
67 Fed. Reg. at 72796 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.4).

review period); U.S. GAO,
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volvement serves as a screen to weed out inappropriate projects, for example those that will exacerbate rather than reduce the threat of fire or those that cause unnecessary environmental damage. Legitimate projects will most likely not
be challenged or easily survive any challenges with minimal delay, while illegitimate projects may get sent back
for reworking.
The HFI's seemingly exclusive focus on eliminating public involvement rather than addressing real fire management
issues appears to stem from frequent court rejections of
flawed timber sales and an inability to sneak commercial
logging projects through the court system disguised as fire
prevention projects. Although the idea that reducing trees in
forests reduces the risk of wildfire has a certain simplistic
logic, it is not necessarily true. 72 In fact, the types of reductions proposed by the Bush Administration may actually increase the risk of wildfires in many instances.
In Sierra Club v. Bosworth, the Forest Service was sued
for its failure to adequately consider the environmental impacts of post-fire salvage logging projects in the Six Rivers
National Forest. The Forest Service attempted to justify the
project on the basis of an imminent threat of fire in the project area. Plaintiffs contended that the EIS failed to reveal
that no scientific evidence or studies agreed with its conclusion that logging a previously burned stand would reduce
future fire intensity, and that it also failed to reveal scientific
studies that concluded that the logging project would actually increase the risk of fire. The Forest Service contended
that it could not take the time to prepare a more adequate EIS
because it had to begin the logging immediately to reduce
the risk that surrounding communities would be placed in
danger by another catastrophic wildfire. Based in part on the
Forest Service's own admissions, the court found the urgency argument unpersuasive.
The Forest Supervisoradmits, however that there is no
significant risk of another intense wildfire within the
nextfiveyears.... Infact, implementationof the Phase]
project may actually increase fire risk in the

short-term.... The No Action alterative would have the
lowest hazard in the short-term .... Thus, the Forest Service has failed to demonstrate that it would be unable to
prepare an adequate EIS and implement its plan before
communities are placed at risk of an intense fire. 4
Accordingly, the court enjoined the Forest Service from implementing any of the proposed salvage logging.
In Land Council v. Vaught, 75 environmental groups
sought to stop a salvage timber sale in the Idaho Panhandle
and Colville national forests. The lower court had found the
plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits, but denied their
GATION OF FOREST SERVICE PROJECTS 2 (2001) (GAO 01- 1114R)

(only 1% of fuel reduction projects from 2001 were appealed by private industry interests, recreation groups, individuals, and environmental groups); ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INSTITUTE, NORTHERN
ARIZONA UNIVERSITY, ANALYZING USDA FOREST SERVICE APPEALS (2003) (appeals by wide range of interest groups on a downward trend since 1998).
72. See, e.g., HENRY CAREY & MARTHA SCHUMANN, MODIFYING
WILDFIRE BEHAVIOR
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FUEL TREATMENTS (Southwest Community Forestry Research Center of the For-

est Trust Apr. 2003), available at http://www.theforesttrust.org/
images/swcenter/pdf/WorkingPaper2.pdf (last visited Aug. 21,
2003).
73. 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 32 ELR 20618 (N.D. Cal 2002).
74. Ild. at 992-93 (emphasis added).
75. 16 Fed. Appx. 768 (9th Cir. 2001).
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motion for injunctive relief on the grounds that the sale
served the public interest by reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires within the forests. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that, contrary to the government's assertion that the sale would reduce the risk of fire,
the record indicated that the salvage project would actually
increase the likelihood and intensity of catastrophic
wildfires. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The risk offire during the firstfew years of timber harvest under the Project will actually be greater than the
risk offire ifno action is taken and the beetle-damaged
timber is not removedfrom the IPNF [Idaho Panhandle NationalForest]. The government has even conceded that
the Projectwould increasethe short-term risk
76

offire.

Based on this finding, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court and remanded the case to allow the district court the
opportunity to decide the case "without relying on that
clearly erroneous finding of fact," i.e., that timber harvest
would reduce the risk of wildfires.
Finding its attempts to justify logging operations as fire
prevention projects rejected by the courts, the Bush Administration has moved to make these types ofprojects more difficult to challenge. The Administration created two new
classes of categorical exclusions. One exempts timber sales
up to 1,000 acres from NEPA environmental impact analysis as long as they are carried out in the name of preventing
fires. Separately, the Bush Administration created a categorical exclusion from NEPA for all timber sales up to 70
acres, salvage timber sales up to 250 acres, and associated
road construction up to one-half mile. 79 This is more than
double the limits set by previous administrations.80
The significance of these exemptions from environmental impact analyses cannot be overstated. A substantial portion of Forest Service timber sales are conducted as fire prevention projects. Many of these are less than 1,000 acres,
while many more could be designed to be less than 1,000
acres. Also troubling is the failure to limit or require analysis
of the cumulative impact of these categorically excluded
sales, two or many more of which could occur in close proximity to one another but still be exempted from NEPA under
the Bush Administration's new categorical exclusions.
Following a case in which the Forest Service narrowly won
a NEPA challenge, the Bush Administration weakened longstanding protections requiring projects that could otherwise
be categorically excluded from NEPA to undergo environmental analysis if they would impact sensitive or rare resources, including "threatened and endangered species or
their designated critical habitat, wilderness areas, inventoried
roadless areas, wetlands, and archeological or historic sites."8'
76. Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. USDA & U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire Management Activities; Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33814 (June 5, 2003).
79. USDA, National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed
for Limited Timber Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44598 (July 29, 2003).
80. USDA, Forest Service National Environmental Policy Act; Revised
Policy and Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg. 43180 (Sept. 18, 1992).
81. USDA, National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed
for Fire Management Activities: Categorical Exclusions, 67 Fed.
Reg 54622 (Aug. 23, 2003) (to be codified at Forest Service Handbook 1909.15, ch. 30.3).
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82
In Utah EnvironmentalCongress v. U.S. ForestService,
plaintiffs sued the Forest Service for categorically excluding from NEPA environmental analysis issuance of a permit
authorizing a 400-vehicle all-terrain vehicle jamboree on
the Fishlake National Forest in Utah even though three "extraordinary circumstances" were potentially affected: endangered species, steep slopes, and a watershed. Plaintiffs
argued that the plain language of the Forest Service handbook required NEPA analysis whenever extraordinary circumstances were present. The Forest Service argued that
ambiguous language in the definition of "extraordinary circumstances" rendered the plain language of the handbook
optional. The court agreed with both parties and deferred to
the Forest Service's interpretation of its own regulations because it was not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
handbook. 8 3 The court concluded: "[T]he Forest Service
argues the mere presence of sensitive environmental conditions does not constitute 'extraordinary circumstances.'
From a plain reading
ofthe handbook, such an interpretation
84
is reasonable.
The Bush Administration prevailed in court with its argument that the relevant policies allowed Forest Service officials to categorically exclude projects from NEPA even
when these sensitive resources were potentially affected.
However, the decision revealed that while not clearly erroneous, there was some question of whether the agency had
the discretion to categorically exclude a project that might
impact sensitive or rare resources. To make it crystal clear
that the agency could avoid NEPA review even where an action might impact sensitive or rare resources, the Forest Service changed its policies.
The Bush Administration is pursuing many other changes
to federal forest policy under the auspices of the HFI. Most
significantly, the Administration aggressively advocated for
new "stewardship contracting" authorities allowing the Forest Service to pay for national forest management obligations directly with trees instead of congressional appropriations; to merge commercial timber sales with service contracts; to keep any money made on these projects; to give
contractors more control over timber sale design, including
which trees to cut; and to grant contractors concessions to
manage tracts of national forests for up to 10 years. These
new powers create incentives for the Forest Service to increase logging in order to increase its budget and offer opportunities for unscrupulous contractors to take advantage
of the reduced federal role in federal timber sales. Stewardship contracting is an untested, fundamental shift in Forest
Service operating procedures, a "major reinvention effort, '8 5 yet, at the request of the Bush Administration, it was
authorized on an unlimited basis for 10 years by a rider
added to the 2003 Interior Appropriations bill during conference between the U.S. House of Representatives and the
U.S. Senate. 6

82. No. 2:01-CV-00390B, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24752 (D. Utah June

The Bush Administration is also altering its wildlife management obligations through the HFI. The Administration
has provided guidance to its wildlife and fisheries agencies
to "adopt a long-term view" when reviewing fuel treatment
projects that may affect federally endangered or threatened
species. 8 7 This guidance tells these agencies that all fire prevention projects should be automatically deemed to benefit
listed species over the long term except "in some very rare
situations" where "long-term benefits of a project may not
be sufficient to offset short-term adverse effects to a species." With this guidance the Administration seeks to preclude wildlife managers from unbiased consideration of
the risks to endangered species stemming from any timber
sale or other activity falling under the broad banner of"fire
prevention." The guidance also urges agencies to "avoid
proposing conservation measures that are overly restrictive from a fire management perspective," that is,conservation measures that might limit logging in the name of
fire prevention.
Most recently, the Bush Administration has proposed a
rule exempting the Forest Service from consultation with
the FWS or the NMFS on any timber sale or other project
carried out under the national fire plan that the Forest Service determines may, but is not likely to, adversely affect a
listed species or its critical habitat. 88 The duty to consult on
the impacts of projects on endangered and threatened species with the agencies charged with their protection is a fundamental provision of the ESA. It exists because fish and
wildlife agencies have the expertise and incentive to properly assess the likely impacts of a project on a listed species,
whereas other federal agencies may have less expertise or
conflicting priorities, such as timber production. Review of
an agency's "not likely to adversely affect" determination
by the FWS or the NMFS is usually done quickly and informally and is not a significant bar to project implementation.
Allowing the Forest Service to proceed without consultation on the basis of its own determination that an action is
not likely to adversely impact an endangered species is
likely to lead to substantial and unnecessary impacts to ESA
listed species.
Denying Meaningful Public Participation
The Bush Administration has proven itself willing to pursue
extreme measures to avoid meaningful public participation
in, and oversight of,its activities above and beyond all of the
efforts to avoid environmental and judicial review previously described.
In Friends of the Clearwater v. McAllister, 9 the Forest
Service issued an environmental analysis and finding of no
significant impact for a proposed timber sale, then solicited
bids for a much different timber sale. The sale proposed for
public comment was for three million board feet of timber.
The plan the Bush Administration secretly authorized was
for the sale of 9.5 million board feet, significantly increasing

19, 2001).
83. Id. at *21.
84. Id.
85.
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86. Pub. L. No. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,
Div. F, §323.

87. Memorandum From Steve Williams, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
& Dr. William T.Hogarth, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, on Evaluating the Net Benefit of Hazardous Fuels
Treatment Projects (Dec. 10, 2002) (also available from the ELR
Guidance & Policy Collection, ELR No. AD04796).
88. U.S. DOI & U.S. Department of Commerce, Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 Fed.
Reg. 33806 (June 5, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
89. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 33 ELR 20040 (D. Mont. 2002).
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the ecological impacts of the sale. When sued by environmental organizations, the Forest Service argued that the
change was not significant and required no further NEPA
review. The district court cited evidence in the record indicating that the Forest Service had planned to authorize the
larger sale all along while intentionally misleading the public. The Forest Service had frustrated NEPA's public notice-and-comment requirements by proceeding publicly as
though the alternatives in the environmental analysis were
still the ones in consideration even after deciding to proceed
with a different sale. The court held "[tlhe bait-and-switch
tactic the ForestService employed defeats the purpose and
intent of NEPA to allow the public opportunity to participate in the decision-makingprocess." The court remanded
the matter to the Forest Service to prepare an environmental
analysis for the amended sale.
In addition to extralegal efforts to avoid public input on
individual projects, the Bush Administration has put forth a
number ofpolicies andproposals to reduce opportunities for
active public participation in national forest management.
Suppressing Project Appeals
The Bush Administration has rewritten the rules for public
appeals of Forest Service projects to make it much more difficult for a citizen or organization to have any meaningful
input regarding a project. Public participation provides
valuable input that decreases ecological risks, increases
the benefit and public acceptance of projects, and gives the
public a voice in decisions that may impact it directly.
Without a citizen right to appeal the agency's final decision, however, this important right is rendered meaningless. The Bush Administration seems willing to accept public input, but not public oversight. The apparent result
sought by the Bush Administration is a public participation
regime in which the public may comment, but the agencies
are free to completely disregard those comments. This "right
without remedy" scheme for public participation is a dramatic step backwards.
The Bush Administration's efforts to change the law to
prevent proj ect appeals started in the courts. In several cases
the Bush Administration has used tactics harshly criticized
by federal judges in its persistent effort to suppress meritorious challenges by the public.
In Wilderness Society v. Rey, 9' following wildfires in the
Bitterroot National Forest in Montana during the summer of
2000, the Forest Service developed a salvage logging project for the burned areas and released a draft EIS. After soliciting and reviewing public comment on the draft, the Forest Service approved a final EIS that selected a new preferred alternative not included in the draft EIS. By inserting
the preferred alternative in the final EIS but not the draft
EIS, the Forest Service effectively deprived the public of the
opportunity to comment on the salvage project. Although
the law and applicable agency regulations mandated the
right to an administrative appeal of such decisions, the Forest Service attempted to deny environmental organizations
an administrative appeal. In what the district court described
as an "extra legal effort to circumvent the law," the Bush Administration attempted to argue that the final EIS was not a
90. Id. at 1089 (emphasis added).
91. 180 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 32 ELR 20440 (D. Mont. 2002).
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decision from which an administrative appeal was authorized because it had been signed by the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and was thus a decision ofthe USDA and not the
Forest Service. 92 The district court rejected this approach,
stating that "[tlhe notion that a signatureby the Undersecretary transformsthe actionfrom ForestService businessto
the business of some other agency is mystical legal prestidigitation.93 The court found that the final EIS decision
was a Forest Service decision regardless of who signed it,
rejected the EIS, and enjoined the timber salvage operations
until the Forest Service complied with the law.
Finding its attempts to avoid review of its actions rejected
by the courts, the Bush Administration published a final rule
on June 4, 2003, significantly modifying the regulations implementing the Appeals Reform Act. Without any legal authority in the Appeals Reform Act, the Administration published regulations giving the Secretary and Undersecretary
for Natural Resources and Environment of the USDA the
power to exempt projects from the appeals process, the very
action previously rejected by the courts in Rey.
The new Bush Administration appeal regulations exempt
all projects categorically excluded from NEPA from appeals, 9 even though the Appeals Reform Act is supposed to
apply to all "proposed actions ofthe Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource
management plans. 95 This allows many, perhaps most,
Forest Service projects to be exempted from NEPA environmental analysis because, as discussed previously, the Bush
Administration has created categorical exclusions from
NEPA for wildfire-related timber sales up to 1,000 acres,
salvage timber sales up to 250 acres, and regular timber
sales up to 70 acres. A huge portion of the Forest Service's
projects will no longer be analyzed for their environmental
impacts and can no longer be administratively appealed by
the public.
The new appeal regulations create a new economic emergency exemption allowing timber sales to go forward in
spite of appeals ifthe appeal could cause a significant loss of
96
economic value. Previous administrations limited this
emergency exemption to situations where human health or
safety or natural resources were threatened. The new appeal
regulations only allow appeals of specific violations of law,
regulation, or policy. 9 Prior administrations accepted appeals based on such violations as well as appeals based on
other considerations such as general disagreement with the
project, legal but undesirable impacts, etc. And the new appeal regulations require the submission of much more detailed, substantive comments at all stages of a project before
the appeal will be accepted. 98
Eliminating Forest Plan Appeals
As part of its effort to render forest plans meaningless, the
Bush Administration plans to stop accepting public appeals
92. Id. at 1148.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. USDA, Notice, Comment, and Appeal Procedures for National Forest System Projects and Activities; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 33582,
33600 (June 4, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §215.12(f)).
95. Pub. L. No. 102-381, 106 Stat. 1419 §322(a).
96. 68 Fed. Reg. at 33596 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §215.2).
97. Id. at 33600 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §215.14(b)(9)).
98. Id. (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §215.13).
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of forest plans. 99 In a case that foreshadows the Bush Administration's regulatory attempts to make forest plans
completely unreviewable, the Forest Service began ignoring appeals even before legally proposing to eliminate its
obligation to respond to those appeals.
In Native Ecosystems Council v. Reese,0 0 an individual
challenged the Forest Service decision adopting a revised
forest plan (RFP) and EIS for the Targhee National Forest in
Montana. After her administrative appeal was ignored for
over a year, the plaintiff sued the Forest Service alleging,
among other things, a de facto pattern and practice of the
Forest Service not responding to administrative appeals of
forest plans as required by law, and listing 14 other forests
for which the Forest Service ignored appeals. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin any ground-disturbing projects under the
RFP-EIS. However, several projects had already relied on
the RFP-EIS and had been concluded. The Forest Service
argued that the plaintiff's claims were moot because the
harm complained of had already come to pass and no injury remained to be averted. The court rejected this argument stating:
By refusing to rule on appeals of forest plans within the
allotted time while at the same time approving projects
tiered to the forest plan, the Forest Service is preventing
administrative appellants from developing full administrative records on the projects and from seeking judicial
review of the forest plan, while concurrently enacting
management directives tiered to the plan.' 0'
The court continued: "Now the Forest Service argues that
this matter is moot, since the illegal activity complained of is
no longer at issue. This rationale,ifadopted, would eviscerate the public' role in land use decisions and adopt a relativist public policy that would have broad implications in
agency decision-making procedures."' 10 2 The court dismissed the Forest Service arguments and granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment.
Other Public Participation Opportunities Eliminated
In its proposed regulations for forest planning under the
NFMA, the Bush Administration has proposed to create a
new entity interim amendments out of thin air. These
interim amendments would set forest management direction
for up to four years without any public involvement, are not
subject to the proposed objection process (that replaces the
current appeals process), and could be renewed indefinitely
as long as notice is given in a local newspaper and public
comment is allowed.
These changes implicate another tactic the Bush Administration is using to make public participation more difficult:
providing notice of important forest management decisions
in local newspapers rather than official FederalRegisterno99. The regulations would replace the existing appeals process with an
unenforceable objection process, which amounts to a limited comment period. 67 Fed. Reg. at 72803 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.
§219.19). An objection process was adopted in the 2000 regulations
but the impacts of that change were mitigated by the rest of the regu
lations, which were overall much stronger than the regulations proposed by the Bush Administration.
100. 212 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 32 ELR 20826 (D. Mont. 2002).
101. Id.at 1233 (emphasis added).
102. Ild.
at 1231 (emphasis added).
103. 67 Fed. Reg. at 72797 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.6(f)).

tices. The Bush Administration has proposed to provide
public notice of three significant determinations in local
newspapers rather than in the FederalRegister: renewals of
the interim amendments just described; forest plan revisions
for which no EIS will be done- and approvals of forest plans,
revisions, and amendments. 6 4 For citizens or groups interested in national forest management these are some of the
most significant decisions that can be made. Missing notice
of these processes would cause the interested party to miss
the most important opportunities to engage in forest management. Yet to stay aware of changes and opportunities in
forest management under the Bush rules, a party would
have to subscribe to a local newspaper from the area of every national forest that party is interested in and read those
papers every day. Parties interested in how all national forests are managed, such as national environmental organizations, would have to subscribe to as many as 155 local
newspapers. The obvious intent of these provisions is to
disenfranchise the national interest in national forest management under the theory that anyone who needs to know
how a national forest is being managed, or who has input
worth soliciting, must live close enough to subscribe to the
local newspaper.
Sweetheart Settlements With Industry
In addition to its administrative attempts to deprive the public of any meaningful input into Forest Service actions, the
Bush Administration has also employed a more direct route
for avoiding accountability, namely the settlement of industry lawsuits to get rid of policies it does not support.
One prominent example is the Northwest (NW) Forest
Plan that guides federal forest management throughout the
range of many species including the northern spotted owl,
which largely inhabits the forests on the western side of the
Cascade Mountains. The NW Forest Plan was a response to
successful litigation by environmental groups proving,
among other things, that the Forest Service was failing to
ensure viable populations of spotted owls on national forests. The Clinton Administration recognized the problems
facing the spotted owl were symptomatic of problems facing many species in the region negatively impacted by intensive logging and road building and required a regionwide
response, being much too large, complicated, interconnected, and important to risk addressing in haphazard fashion at the individual forest level. The NW Forest Plan includes many provisions to curb the impact of logging on the
spotted owl and other species.
Following a successful Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund attorneys, the
Bush Administration grudgingly disclosed a novel method
for dealing with industry lawsuits giving industry everything it wants. In a secret "Global Framework for Settlement" agreement between the Department of the Interior,
the USDA, and eight or so industry groups, the Bush Administration agreed to a wholesale revision of forest policy
in the Pacific NW in return for a possible future dismissal of
four industry lawsuits: DouglasTimber Operatorsv. Secretary ofAgriculture,0 5 which sought to weaken the NW Forest Plan survey and manage program for protecting old
104. Id. at 72797, 72798, 72804 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.
§§219.7(f)(3), 219.8(b), 219.21(a)).
105. No. 01-CV-6378-AA (D. Or.).
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growth-dependent species; Western Council of Industrial
Workers v. Secretary of the Interior,10 6 which was a challenge to the critical habitat designation of the northern spotted owl by timber and industry interests who sought a species status review and an elimination of the listing and critical habitat designation for the owl; American Forests Resource Council v. Secretaryof the Interior,10 7 which sought
review and elimination of the listing and critical habitat designation for the marbled murrelet; and American Forests
Resource Council v. Clarke,0 8 a case twice dismissed by the
district court that challenged the NW Forest Plan's set aside
of old growth and riparian reserves on Oregon and California railroad grant lands.
In secretly settling these cases, the Bush Administration
agreed to amend the NW Forest Plan in the following ways:
to eliminate the requirements that it "survey and manage"
national forests to protect certain species; to weaken the
Aquatic Conservation Strategy by eliminating requirements
that timber sales not degrade watershed conditions to the
detriment of endangered species of salmon or their habitat;
and to review the status of the northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet and to redesignate critical habitat for both
based on an economic analysis. Finally, the Bush Administration agreed to amend the NW Forest Plan to eliminate old
growth and riparian reserves on Oregon and California grant
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management and to
affirm that timber production be the management priority
for those lands.
In another case, National Ass 'n of Home Builders v. Evans,10 9 the Bush Administration agreed in a settlement to repeal and review the listings and critical habitat designations
for 19 species of endangered salmon much of which was
on national forests. The suit alleged the critical habitat designation caused or would cause economic injuries to property owners, individuals, and small businesses through project delays, uncertainties, and biological analyses that could
be required as part of a project approval process. In response
to this suit, the NMFS agreed to put economics ahead of endangered species and submitted a proposed settlement
agreement that would rescind its current critical habitat designations for the 19 salmon populations at issue and agreed
to conduct further scientific research and economic analysis
and make new critical habitat designations.
Gutting Roadless Area and Wilderness Protections
The Bush Administration settlement that gives away the
most involves forests with no roads. On January 5,2001, the
federal government adopted the Roadless Area Conservation Rule protecting the remaining public forests in the
United States that have not had roads built through them
from new road building and commercial timber sales." 0
This move came after decades of debate over the fate of
roadless forests in America, after numerous attempts to end
massive taxpayer subsidies for logging roads, and after
three years of planning and public process that included 600
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public meetings around the country and millions of public
comments. Roadless lands have been reduced to a small percentage of the landscape in spite of their many benefits.
Roadless areas provide critically important habitat for species that require intact forests, room to roam, and refuge
from people. They offer unmatched backcountry recreation
experiences. They sustain clean water and clean air.
On January 20, 2001, his first day in office, President
Bush withdrew this and other environmental rules for review. " On May 3, 2001, nearly two months after the roadless rule was legally required to take effect, the Administration finally agreed to implement the rule as written, but also
approved plans to rewrite it. The Administration was spared
the trouble, at least temporarily, when a few days later a
court enjoined the rule, primarily because the Administration failed to defend it in court even though U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft swore before Congress he would uphold it.
In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,"12 and Idaho ex
rel. Kempthorne v. U.S. ForestService,"13 the Bush Administration refused to defend the roadless rules against an industry NEPA challenge, temporarily avoiding a court decision by pledging to reconsider and change the roadless
rules. In Idaho v. U.S. ForestService,"14 and Kootenai Tribe
5
ofIdaho,"1
after finding insufficient support for a change in
the rules, the agency again refused to defend the roadless
rules against an industry NEPA challenge. Instead, the Bush
Administration handed victory to the wise-use and industry
plaintiffs, stating "[t]he USDA shares plaintiff's concerns
about the potential for irreparable harm in the long-term
[sic] under the current rule.""116 The "harm" referred to was
the speculative harm that might befall the roadless forests if
the Forest Service curtailed "management and maintenance" activities basically timber sales due to the lack
of roads. The district court cited the Bush Administration's
agreement with the concerns of industry groups and ruled to
enjoin application of the roadless rule.
After this injunction, the Bush Administration implemented two interim directives for managing roadless areas
until a court decided the fate of the rule or the Administration rewrote it. 117 The interim directives effectively but quietly rolled back the roadless rule by returning management
ofroadless areas to the status quo before the rule was implemented with one exception-approval of a regional forester
or the Chief of the Forest Service was required before roadbuilding or commercial logging could commence in a roadless area.
On appeal, the injunction rendered in the Idaho and
Kootenai cases was dissolved by the Ninth Circuit, which
stated: "[T]he Forest Service, now governed by a new presidential administration which is perhaps less sympathetic to
111. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, White House Office, for the
Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Jan. 20, 2001).
112. 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 31 ELR 20617 (D. Idaho 2001).
113. 142 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Idaho 2001).

106. No. 02-CV-6100-AA (D. Or.).
107. No. 02-CV-6078-AA (D. Or.).
108. No. C94-1031-TPJ (D.D.C.).
109. No. 00-CV-2799 (D.D.C.).
110. USDA, Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg.
3243 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).

114. No. 01-CV-11, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21990 (D. Idaho Apr. 5,
2001).
115. 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
116. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21990, at *1.
117. USDA, Roadless Area Protection; Interim Direction, 66 Fed. Reg.
44111 (Aug. 22,2001); USDA, Forest Transportation System Analysis; Roadless Area Protection, 66 FR 65796 (Dec. 20, 2001).
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the Roadless Rule, expressed concern 'about the potential
for irreparable harm in the long term' caused by the
Roadless Rule.""' 8 The Ninth Circuit rejected such concerns
stating: "NEPA may not be used to preclude lawful conservation measures by the ForestService and to force-federal
agencies, in contraventionof theirown policy objectives,1to
19
develop and degrade scarce environmental resources."
In yet another collusive settlement agreement, the Bush
Administration has undermined significant portions of the
roadless rule in a settlement agreement with the state of
Alaska and Alaskan timber interests. This settlement comes
after the Bush Administration failed in its earlier attempt to
rid itself of the roadless rule by refusing to defend it in court
against a challenge by states, industry groups, and wise-use
groups. In those cases, environmental groups won the right
to intervene and defended the government against its will. In
the Alaska roadless case, the government negotiated a settlement out of court to prevent environmental groups from
successfully intervening to defend the public interest.
The Alaska roadless case settlement itself has, at least
temporarily, accomplished two troubling things. First, it exempts the Tongass and Chugach National Forests in Alaska
from the roadless rule. These two forests contain one-quarter of all Forest Service surveyed roadless areas. Exempting
these two forests from the protections ofthe roadless rule severely undermines the protections of the rule. Second, the
settlement creates a mechanism for state governors to request waivers from the roadless rule for certain reasons,
such as an exemption to create and maintain roads for the
purpose of "reducing hazardous fuels," i.e., logging. Despite this clear evisceration of the roadless rule, the Bush
Administration's press release deceptively announced this
settlement as "Retaining the National Forest Roadless Area
Conservation Rule."
Understanding the Implications and Conclusion
The constant stream of forest-hostile court arguments and
the barrage of regulatory and policy changes analyzed in
this Article are being carried out in a carefully orchestrated
and systematic manner. The Bush Administration's pattern
and practice of working against forest laws and protection in
the courts, through administrative changes and practices,
and with recommendations to Congress, clearly show a
carefully thought-out, well-organized attempt to undo forest
protections in the United States. The Bush Administration is
implementing the timber industry's long-standing agenda of
reversing those forest policies that put wildlife and the public on equal footing with extractive interests.
The breadth and scale of the changes being made to national forest policy cannot be fully appreciated by looking at
individual proposals, but must be considered as a whole. In
addition to direct cumulative impacts, many of the changes
directly interact with one another, compounding their effect
so that the whole is much greater than the sum ofthe parts.
For example, the Bush Administration took the position
that roadless areas could be best protected or at least managed with local input provided through forest plans, and
therefore a nationwide rule was not necessary. The Bush
118. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1124, 33 ELR
20130 (9th Cir. 2002).
119. Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).

Administration conveniently ignored the fact that the
roadless rule was needed precisely because forest plans had
proven ineffective in preventing the loss of roadless areas.
Then, the Bush Administration set about gutting the very
forest planning regulations through which it would have
managed roadless areas. To its proposed forest planning
regulations, the Administration has proposed to eliminate
not only wildlife, environmental, and specific roadless area
protections, but also the public participation processes
through which local residents and other members of the
public might influence management of the forests and actually protect roadless areas. Further, if roadless areas are
successfully protected in a forest plan in spite of these barriers, those protections would be nonbinding under this Administration's proposal to make forest plan standards effectively optional.
In rewriting the forest planning regulations, the Bush Administration asserts that environmental analysis is not
needed on forest plans because it will be done on site-specific projects. However, not only has the Administration repeatedly argued in court that forest plan provisions do not
apply to projects and cannot be challenged at the project
level, it has also exempted huge categories of projects from
all environmental analysis. The projects that will no longer
be subject to environmental analysis include fire-related
timber sales up to 1,000 acres, salvage timber sales up to 250
acres, and all timber sales up to 70 acres, even if many of
these sales are in close proximity. In creating these new categorical exclusions, the Bush Administration asserted that
any projects that affect sensitive resources will still be subject to environmental analysis, while simultaneously making environmental review in such "extraordinary circumstances" optional for forest managers.
Furthermore, the Bush Administration's appeal regulations do not allow appeals of categorically excluded projects. Even for remaining appealable projects, the government may proceed with the project in spite of the appeal if it
might result in a substantial loss of economic value to the
government, thereby rendering the appeal moot. The government can now also avoid appeals by simply failing to respond to them, or having a USDA official exempt a project
from appeal. A would-be appellant may still go to court to
try to stop the project, but without the opportunity for an administrative appeal, the appellant will not likely have much
of a record on which to build a case. Once in court, as this
Article reveals, the plaintiff has a 67% chance of facing arguments that are hostile to accepted forest law. Worse, following the Bush Administration's regulatory changes, the
plaintiff will have to struggle to find any enforceable legal
provisions with which to challenge questionable Forest Service practices.
In the cases surveyed for this Article, the arguments ofthe
Bush Administration present an unmistakable trend. When
the law requires the Bush Administration to consider ecological factors beyond removing board feet of lumber from a
national forest, the Forest Service often responds by ignoring or breaking that law. Where the Forest Service's unlawful actions or arguments are rejected by the federal courts,
the Forest Service frequently proposes administrative
changes to the rules, often in collusive settlements with timber-industry litigants.
Despite the deceptive rhetoric employed by Bush Administration environmental officials, the Forest Service is en-
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gaged in the most dramatic revision of forest management
policy in agency history. By eliminating environmental review of many timber sales, eliminating the requirement for
compliance with comprehensive management plans, eliminating the requirement to preserve wildlife viability, and
eliminating public participation, the Bush Administration
has chosen to ignore the lessons of more than a century of
forest management. Unchecked, the changes proposed by
the Bush Administration in response to its litigation failures
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will destroy the balance of ecological, commercial, and recreational values that has ensured the productivity and vitality of our national forests. Cumulatively, these changes signal the end of the modem era forest management, with its
recognition of the values of nontimber resources and effective public involvement in public land management. Unless
either Congress or the federal courts intervene, the Forest
Service of President Bush may2 do permanent harm to this
nation's irreplaceable forests. 0

Appendix A

Judicial Accountability Forest Law Project
Methodology
The Judicial Accountability Project is intended to survey
federal court cases involving federal environmental laws
decided since the beginning of the Bush Administration.
This Article covers the arguments made by the Bush Administration in federal court cases implicating statutory law,
regulations, or rules related to our National Forests (hereinafter comprehensively referred to as forest law) decided
from January 21,2001, to January 21, 2003, and the results
of these legal arguments. This Article considered decided
cases in which the Bush Administration made substantive
arguments where those arguments had some impact on national forest management. The project is intended to yield
data about the arguments made by the Bush Administration
in federal court proceedings and the results of those arguments during this period. The expectation is that these data
will allow accurate analysis ofthe Administration's track record in federal litigation as it pertains to forest law issues.
Methodology for this project is best described in terms of:
The Survey Process, which determines the cases to be included; the Case Review Database, which allows the incorporation of case information in a referenced and searchable
format; Case Categorization, which determines the qualitative value of each argument made by the Bush Administration; Numerical and Narrative Reports; and the Judicial
Voting Record Assessment, which summarizes information
from the Case Review Database.
The Survey Process
InitialSurvey ofFederalCourt Actionsfor Project
Relevance

ments: federal government involvement in the case and
presence of significant forest law issues. A description of
these elements follows.
Is the Forest Service the Defendant in the Action?
National Forests are governed and impacted by many federal laws, regulations, and rules. Many agencies are charged
with responsibilities under these laws. This Article is limited to those decided cases in which the Forest Service is either a defendant or co-defendant in a federal lawsuit.
Are Significant Forest Law Issues Presented and Decided?
Significant forest law issues are deemed presented when
the Forest Service or the U.S. Department of Agriculture
made arguments that could significantly affect national
forests. Such arguments include interpretations of one or
more of the major statutes governing forests, agency regulations or rules implementing forest policy, or arguments
potentially affecting significant forest resources. The cases
included in the database are those cases in which the reviewing court specifically reaches the Forest Service argument in
its decision.
Following this methodology, 62 cases were selected as
relevant and proceeded to the substantive review process.
Substantive Review ofApplicable Cases
Cases making the first cut for relevance to the project described above are next carefully examined for inclusion
within the Judicial Accountability Case Review Database.
Generally, cases that are rejected during substantive review
120. See, e.g., Matt Weiser, Giant Sequoias Could Get the Ax,
COUNTRY NEWS,

The initial review involves broad electronic searches on
both Westlaw and Lexis, using key terms related to environmental law, to derive a comprehensive list of all federal
court decisions with implications for forest law. The decisions covered in this Article may be either final dispositive
decisions that ultimately resolve a case, or decisions on motions resolving important procedural or substantive aspects
of a case. The survey is intended to canvass the universe of
federal court decisions as comprehensively as possible.
Out of this universe of court decisions, relevant cases are
selected or rejected for inclusion in the substantive review
process on the basis of the presence or absence of two ele-

HIGH

June 29, 2003. The Forest Service is considering a

logging project for up to 8,000 acres of the Sequoia National Monument, including clearcuts, that would allow up to 10 million board
feet of lumber each year to be removed from the forest.

1. A number of cases were reviewed in which an agency other than the
Forest Service was the defendant in a lawsuit with clear implications
to forest law issues. See, e.g., Cascadia Wildlands Project v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 33 ELR 20020 (D. Or.
2002) (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion (BO)
failed to ensure that timber sale would comply with Aquatic Conservation Strategy and would not jeopardize listed bull trout. The Forest
Service was enjoined from implementing timber sales that relied on
an invalid BO). These cases were not included in the database and
are not reflected in the numerical assessment.

12-2003

NEWS & ANALYSIS

33 ELR 10975

Copyright © 2003 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC.reprinted with permission from ELR®, htt2://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

are cases in which the Bush Forest Service raises arguments
that initially appeared to have forest law implications on
cursory examination, but are found not to present such precise issues on closer examination.
Clinton-Inherited Cases
A number of otherwise relevant cases originated under the
Clinton Administration and carried over into the current
Bush Administration. There are even some cases that originated under the previous Bush Administration, predating
President Clinton. The methodology for determining which
arguments are counted as attributable to the current Bush
Administration from these overlapping cases focuses on the
motion that proved dispositive of a particular case. Regardless of when the case was filed, if the current Bush Administration files the particular motion or a substantial revision of
the motion upon which the court rules in a particular decision, it is counted as a Bush Administration argument.
Subsequent Appellate Decisions
A number of decided cases in which the Bush Administration presents arguments are subsequently the subject of appeals. In cases where the appellate court overturns the lower
court, only the appellate case is reflected in the database in
order to avoid the confounding effect of having a case reported with two different outcomes.
Judiciability Arguments
The Bush Administration makes a number of judiciability
arguments in the surveyed forest law cases. The judiciability arguments that are counted for the purposes of this
Article are judiciability arguments specifically pertaining
to forest law issues and directly linked to substantive forest
policy decisions.
Substantive review provides a more rigorous filter for database applicability and for the correct categorization of legal arguments and results. Out of the 62 cases reviewed pursuant to the above methodology, 44 were placed into the final database. Eighteen cases were determined not applicable to the survey as a result of the several screens we applied
to eliminate cases not directly germane to our inquiry.
The Case Review Database
The following information is compiled in the Case Review
Database: Database Tracking Number; Case Caption; Case
Citation; Court; Date of Decision; Docket Number; Statute;
Agency; Environmental or Industry Plaintiff; Statement of
Case; Procedural Posture of the Case; Issues Presented in
the Case; Whether the Government Argument Was Positive,
Neutral, or Hostile; Court Holding; Quote; Whether the
Court Agreed With the Bush Administration; Result of the
Case; Whether the Case Originated Under Clinton; Deciding Judge(s); Year of Nomination; Whether It Was a
Democrat- or Republican-Appointed Majority; Whether It
Was an Administrative Court; Whether the Decision Was
Overturned; and the Appellate Citation. The Database also
tracked the following issues implicated in the case: National
Forest Management Act Planning Regulations; Consistency
Requirement; Ohio Forestry Argument; Viability Regula-

tions; Forest Plan Violations; Roads and Transportation;
Roadless Area Conservation Rule; Motorized Recreation;
Wilderness; Fire; Avoiding the National Environmental
Policy Act; Avoiding the Appeals Reform Act; Regional
Plans; Aquatic Conservation Strategy Consistency ; National Northwest Forest Plan Settlements; Water Rights;
Clean Water Act and Total Maximum Daily Loads; and the
Endangered Species Act.
Case Categorization
This Article placed all Bush Administration forest law arguments into one of three categories: hostile, consistent, or
positive. Making this determination was central to this study,
and we undertook the task carefully and conservatively.
Hostile
Forest Service arguments are categorized as hostile where
substantial evidence exists, either within the government's
arguments or the court's interpretation and reiteration of
those arguments, that the Forest Service advocated a position avoiding or eroding forest law accepted precedent.
Cases falling into this category include: cases where the
Bush Forest Service used judiciability arguments rejected
by the reviewing court to attempt to avoidjudicial review of
its failure to comply with applicable substantive forest law
or regulatory forest plan consistency requirements; cases
where the court rejected Bush Forest Service arguments that
it was not required to comply with some provision of forest
law or regulations; and cases in which the Bush Forest Service sought to defend decisions or interpretations of forest
law found defective or incomplete by the reviewing court.
Neutral
Forest Service arguments are categorized as neutral where
the evidence indicates the government advocated a position
not tending to erode forest law or accepted precedent. Cases
falling into this category include: those in which the Bush
Administration argued, and the reviewing court agreed, that
it had complied with the applicable requirements of forest
law and based its arguments on the adequacy of the facts
contained in the administrative record; and cases in which
the Bush Administration defended its actions or decisions
against petitioners asserting interests hostile to the goals and
intent of applicable forest law. In a number of cases the Bush
Administration presented arguments that appear contrary to
sound forest management, but were labeled as forest-lawneutral. Where an argument comports with applicable forest
law it is labeled neutral despite the fact that it may be inconsistent with overall forest health.
Positive
Forest Service arguments are categorized as positive where
the evidence indicates that the government's position
tended to promote or even advance the interests protected by
the laws governing our forests.
Numeric Report
The numeric data discuss the total number of cases: in-
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cluded in the survey; in which the Bush Administration presented forest-law-hostile arguments; in which the Bush Administration presented forest-law-neutral arguments; and in
which the Bush Administration presented forest-law-positive arguments. The Numeric Report studies trends in the
Bush Administration's arguments as well as the courts' responses to those arguments.

tive report focuses on key cases in some detail to illustrate
trends, themes, and patterns in the Bush Forest Service's legal arguments during federal litigation. The narrative also
discusses forest law changes undertaken or proposed by the
Bush Administration.

Narrative Report

The Assessment of Judicial Voting Records tracks the trends
of the judiciary in deciding cases when presented with Bush
Forest Service forest-hostile arguments. Information is
compiled on the judge or judges of record in each case, including who appointed the judge. Information is then compiled tracking the number of times judges appointed by Republicans or Democrats presented with forest-law-hostile
arguments agreed with those arguments. For the district
courts information is compiled on a straight partisan analysis. For the appellate courts, information is compiled for
100% Republican-appointed panels, 66.7% Republican-appointed panels, 66.7% Democrat-appointed panels, and
100% Democrat-appointed panels.

The narrative report is a descriptive, qualitative summary of
the arguments the Bush Administration presented in the
cases included within the survey subject area. The intent is
to analyze the legal arguments made by the Bush Administration and the ramifications of those arguments in order to
illustrate trends in the Bush Forest Service's efforts to fulfill its statutory and regulatory responsibilities. The Article
also discusses the consistency between the Bush Administration's interpretation of environmental laws and the interpretation of those laws by the federal courts. The narra-

Judicial Voting Record Assessment

Appendix B

Numeric Assessment of Bush Forest Service
Arguments
During the first two years of the Bush Administration, the
Forest Service was the defendant in lawsuits challenging
forest policy or management decisions 61 times. Ofthese 61
cases, we eliminated 15, 5 of which were overturned and 10
ofwhich were eliminated because they either presented procedural issues that had no bearing on forest law or were
cases inherited from the Clinton Administration in which
the Bush Administration made no substantive arguments.
In the remaining 46 applicable cases, the Bush Administration presented arguments hostile to accepted forest law
31 times or 67% of the time. Despite the high degree of deference that administrative agencies receive from reviewing
courts, the Bush Administration prevailed in only three of
its forest-hostile arguments a 90% failure rate. By contrast, the Bush Administration presented arguments consistent with forest law 15 times or 33% of the time. Twelve of
these arguments (26% of the total) were forest-law-neutral
in that the Bush Administration merely followed the law despite an outcome that did not demonstrably further the goals
of forest management. Three of these arguments (7% of the
total) were forest-law-positive in that the Bush Administration actively defended national forest laws and promoted
forest management policies. The Bush Administration pre-

vailed in all 15 cases in which it presented arguments consistent with the goals of applicable forest law and policy.
Of the 31 cases (67%) in which the Bush Administration
presented forest-law-hostile arguments, 30 of these forest-law-hostile arguments were in response to challenges
filed by environmental petitioners. The other case was a National Environmental Policy Act challenge to the Roadless
Area Conservation Rule that the government refused to defend and, in fact, conceded to the industry plaintiffs. Nineteen of these cases were challenges to timber sales; three
were challenges to grazing permits; three challenges to the
development of roads; and the balance were challenges to
pesticide use, land exchanges, and special use permits. See
Figure B-2.
Of the 12 cases (26%) in which the Bush Administration
presented neutral arguments, 9 of these were cases where
the reviewing court upheld the Forest Service action
against challenges by environmental petitioners. Of these
nine cases, four upheld the government in challenges to
timber sales, and five involved management decision related to grazing, motorized access, predator control, and a
land swap.
The three cases (7%) in which the Bush Administration
presented forest-law-positive arguments were all in response to industry challenges.

2. See Willow Creek Ecology v. U.S. Forest Serv., 225 F. Supp. 2d
1312, 33 ELR 20072 (D. Utah 2002); Conservation Action Project v.
Moore, No. 02-193, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351 (D.N.H. Dec. 18,
2002); and Superior Wilderness Action Network v. U.S. Forest
Serv., No. 01-29, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1703 (D. Minn. Jan. 30,
2002) (court agreed with the government that viability requirements
were not applicable to individual projects).

3. See Utah Shared Access Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 288 F.3d
1205, 32 ELR 20642 (10th Cir. 2002) (court upheld government
over challenge to its decision to destroy roads to improve watershed
condition); Central South Dakota Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Secretary
of Agriculture, 266 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2001) (court upheld decision
to reduce stocking level on grazing lease and held Forest Service was
not required to consider higher level of grazing when reissuing
lease); Montana Snowmobile Ass'n v. Wildes, 26 Fed. Appx. 762,
32 ELR 20479 (9th Cir. 2002) (court upheld Forest Service decision
to close trails to snowmobile access).
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Bush Forest-Law-Hostile Arguments
Total Number of Cases in Which Court Agreed
With Bush

Appendix C

Bush Forest-Law-Neutral Arguments
Total Number of Cases in Which Court Agreed
With Bush

12

Tracking the Federal Judiciary

12

Bush Forest-Law-Positive Arguments
Total Number of Cases in Which Court Agreed
With Bush

3

The following provides a summary of the federal court record in deciding Bush forest-hostile arguments from January 21, 2001, to January 21, 2003.
The courts were fairly uniform in rejecting Bush forest-law-hostile arguments. Out of the 30 cases in which we
categorized the Bush Forest Service arguments as hostile,
the courts agreed with the forest-law-hostile arguments on
only 3 occasions. All three decisions agreeing with Bush
forest-law-hostile arguments were made by district courts.
Two of the judges were Democrat-appointed and one was
Republican-appointed. The courts unanimously accepted
arguments made by the Bush Administration that were either forest-law-neutral or forest-law-positive regardless of
the court's political persuasion.
Republican-appointed courts were presented with forest-law-hostile arguments four times, agreeing with the
Bush Administration only once. Republican-appointed
courts were presented with forest-law-neutral arguments
seven times, agreeing with all of them. Republican-appointed courts were presented with no forest-law-positive arguments.
Democrat-appointed courts were presented with forest-law-hostile arguments 27 times, agreeing with the Bush
Administration twice. Democrat-appointed courts were
presented with forest-law-neutral arguments five times, and
agreed with all of them. Democrat-appointed courts were
presented with forest-law-positive arguments three times
and agreed with all.
The real difference appears when the total numbers are
compared. Republican courts were presented with Bush
Forest Service arguments 11 times and agreed with 8 of
them. Democrat courts were presented with Bush Forest
Service arguments 35 times and agreed with 10 of them.
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